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INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, Rosemary Quinn was perusing the aisles of a 
Walgreens store in New York when she happened upon a line of 
joint health dietary supplements.1  The labels of the joint 
supplements advertised that they contained glucosamine and 
chondroitin, and that these supplements would “help rebuild 
cartilage.”2  After reading and reviewing the representation on 
the labels, Quinn purchased the products and subsequently took 
them as directed.3  The product line of Walgreens’ “Glucosamine 
Supplements consists of six different products that vary in 
formulation, strength, and quantity.”4  Each of the Glucosamine 
Supplements contains glucosamine hydrochloride and 
chondroitin sulfate, although each product contains many other 
ingredients as well.5 
After consuming the product that she purchased, Quinn 
realized that her cartilage had not been rebuilt as the label had 
advertised.6  Accordingly, Quinn and another plaintiff 
commenced an action on November 9, 2012, asserting claims 
under New York and Connecticut consumer protection statutes.7  
The named plaintiffs of the putative class action alleged that 
Walgreens misrepresented its supplements’ abilities to “rebuild 
cartilage,” and that the plaintiffs suffered economic injury as a 
result of this deceptive business practice.8  In response to the 
complaint, defendant Walgreens filed a motion to dismiss the 
claims regarding five of the Glucosamine Supplements because 
the named plaintiffs had only purchased one of the Walgreens 
supplements.9  Walgreens alleged the named plaintiffs did not  
 
 
1 Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
2 Id. at 537 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 Id. at 538. 
4 Id. at 537. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 538. 
7 Id. at 537, 538. 
8 Id. at 537. 
9 Id. at 541. 
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have standing to assert claims against the other products in the 
product line that the named plaintiffs had not, in fact, 
purchased.10 
This scenario—named plaintiffs of a putative consumer 
protection class action seeking to assert claims relating to 
products that they did not purchase themselves—has, in recent 
years, become more frequent within the federal court system.11  
However, in deciding the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack 
of standing, district courts across the country have been anything 
but uniform.12  This Note analyzes the various district court 
decisions that have addressed this issue and proposes a test for 
the uniform adjudication of such scenarios. 
Before the adoption of state consumer protection statutes in 
the 1970s and 1980s, there was very limited protection against 
fraud and abuse in the marketplace.13  The Federal Trade 
Commission Act14 (“FTC Act”), which had prohibited unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices since 1938, was largely ineffective in 
policing such behavior.15  Accordingly, defrauded consumers were 
often preempted from bringing suit because of small-print 
disclaimers on the products they purchased.16  The only remedies 
consumers had were actions for common law fraud or unjust 
enrichment, which carry high burdens of proof, including the 
seller’s state of mind at the time of the purchase.17  Additionally, 
very few states had provisions reimbursing consumers for 
attorneys’ fees.18  The lack of reimbursement meant that few 
attorneys would take these cases and the consumer would, 
consequently, rarely be made whole.19 
In recognition of the deficiencies in our legal system for the 
protection of consumers and the inefficiency of the FTC in 
protecting against businesses’ deceptive practices, a consumer 
 
10 Id. 
11 See Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889–91 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (describing numerous cases in which similar scenarios have taken place). 
12 Id. 
13 Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 
CENTER INC. 5 (2009). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
15 Carter, supra note 13, at 5. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 6. 
19 Id. 
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protection movement emerged, resulting in the passage of 
consumer protection legislation by every state.20  Today, the state 
statutes vary in the extent of the protections they afford the 
consumer.  Specifically, the statutes vary in their substantive 
prohibitions and the scope of the remedial powers they allot to 
state enforcement agencies or consumers.21  The states used the 
FTC Act and several model statutes to draft legislation that 
brought consumer justice to the state, local, and individual 
levels.22  The statutes empowered state agencies and individual 
consumers to bring actions to remedy unfair and deceptive 
practices.23 
In addition to their basic protections for the individual 
consumer, unfair and deceptive practices statutes are 
advantageous because of their beneficial effect on the 
marketplace.24  By working to eliminate fraudulent and 
predatory practices, such statutes disincentivize these behaviors 
and, consequently, promote fair competition among honest 
merchants.25  Although the penalties are primarily civil in 
nature, these statutes allow for criminal penalties for extreme 
violations.26  They allow state enforcement agencies, such as a 
state’s Attorney General, to obtain orders prohibiting a merchant 
from engaging in certain unfair or deceptive behavior, or impose 
civil monetary penalties for violations.27  The statutes are most 
effective, however, in allowing the individual consumer to seek 
remedies.28  Such remedies are usually the return of payments or 
compensation for loss, an injunction preventing the company 
from continuing to use the deceptive practice, and, in most states, 
the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees.29 
 
 
20 Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse 
by Requiring Plaintiffs To Allege Reliance As an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1, 14 (2006). Some states passed more than one statute. Carter, supra note 
13, at 6. 
21 Carter, supra note 13, at 6. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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For years, consumer protection was largely limited to the 
state court systems.  However, with legislation designed to 
broaden a litigant’s access to the federal courts, Congress 
diverted numerous consumer protection suits to the federal 
arena.30  
Following Congress’ enactment of the Class Action Fairness 
Act of 200531 (“CAFA”), there has been a dramatic increase in 
consumer protection class action litigation brought in the federal 
courts.32  This surge occurred because CAFA furnishes the 
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear suits arising from both 
federal consumer protection statutes, as well as state consumer 
protection class action claims with diversity of citizenship.33  In 
enacting CAFA, Congress sought to remedy some of the abuses of 
the class action system—namely, forum shopping by plaintiffs in 
state courts with reputations for hostility toward business 
defendants and class settlements that benefitted counsel more 
than the class members themselves.34  The legislation has 
prompted the federal courts’ adjudication of claims that were 
traditionally reserved for the state courts.35 
This new era of federal consumer class actions has been met 
with certain procedural inconsistencies in how the federal courts 
have adjudicated these consumer protection claims.  One such 
inconsistency continues to be exacerbated by the recent influx of 
consumer protection class actions.36  The issue arises in instances 
where the named plaintiffs in putative consumer protection class 
actions seek to assert claims relating to products that they 
themselves did not purchase.  Because the named plaintiffs did 
not purchase the products over which they assert claims, 
defendants move to dismiss the claims against the unpurchased 
products for lack of standing.37  The question is:  Should the 
standing of a named plaintiff in a putative consumer protection 
class action to assert claims relating to products he or she did not 
 
30 See infra Part I.B. 
31 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012). 
32 See infra Part I.B. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 The Class Action Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12, 
2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-years-
later-04-12-2010/. 
37 See, e.g., Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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purchase be addressed at the motion to dismiss stage, or is this a 
question more appropriately addressed at the Rule 23 class 
certification stage of litigation? 
This Note analyzes the two approaches federal courts have 
taken when addressing this question.  The first approach is to 
hold that named plaintiffs can never assert claims relating to 
products that they themselves did not purchase, and therefore, 
such claims should not survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.38  
The second approach is to hold that the question of whether a 
named plaintiff may assert a claim relating to unpurchased 
products is a question better suited for resolution during the Rule 
23 class certification stage of the litigation.39  Accordingly, such 
an approach denies a defendant’s motion to dismiss and reserves 
decision on the issue of standing until class certification.  
Looking at the history and rationale underlying consumer 
protection statutes and the purpose of the class action 
mechanism itself, this Note concludes that a named plaintiff’s 
standing to assert claims against unpurchased products in a 
putative consumer protection class action is a question properly 
addressed at the Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation. 
Part I discusses the history of, and purpose underlying, state 
consumer protection statutes, followed by an overview of modern 
standing doctrine and its relation to consumer protection actions 
and class actions generally. 
Part II discusses the conflicting cases involving named 
plaintiffs who seek to assert claims relating to products they did 
not purchase that have been decided by district courts across the 
country, highlighting the two distinct approaches courts have 
taken to deal with this procedural issue.  District courts adopting 
the first approach have determined that a named plaintiff can 
never assert claims over products that they did not purchase.  
The second approach generally holds that whether named 
plaintiffs have standing to assert claims relating to products they 
themselves did not purchase is a question that must be 
addressed at the Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation.  
However, the federal courts’ application of the second approach is 
mired with inconsistency and confusion. 
 
38 See infra Part II.A. 
39 See infra Part II.B. 
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Part III concludes that the most appropriate solution to the 
procedural issue is an adoption of the second approach.  This 
conclusion is based on the United States’ implementation of 
consumer protection statutes, the history and policy underlying 
such statutes, and the relationship between modern standing 
doctrine and the class action mechanism itself.  However, due to 
inconsistency in how courts have applied the second approach, 
this Part seeks to formulate a response which remedies such 
inconsistency and creates a uniform test for addressing the issue. 
This Note determines that whether a named plaintiff has 
standing to assert claims relating to unpurchased products is a 
question of class standing and is therefore a question for the Rule 
23 class certification stage of litigation.  However, in certain 
situations, a named plaintiff’s claims against unpurchased 
products should not survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  
Accordingly, this Note proposes a test to determine when the 
claim should survive.  At the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, 
a named consumer protection class action plaintiff’s claims 
relating to products purchased by unnamed members of the 
putative class should survive defendant’s motion when there is 
“sufficient similarity” between the unpurchased products and the 
product plaintiff actually purchased.40  Such a determination, 
calling for an analysis into the similarity of claims, is better 
suited for the Rule 23 class certification stage of litigation than 
the motion to dismiss stage.  Federal district courts should 
presume sufficient similarity between the products (i) when the 
product over which standing is sought is of the same product line 
as that product which was actually purchased by the named 
plaintiff; (ii) when the products have common ingredients or 
components and such ingredients or components are the primary 
or material selling points of the products; and (iii) when the 
plaintiff does not allege injury based solely on the alleged 
misrepresentations, but rather on the diminution in value 
resulting from the product defect that exists in all products, such 
that if certification is granted, the proposed class would include 
plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims. 
 
40 Some courts have used the language “substantially similar.” See, e.g., 
Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–922 (N.D. Cal 2012). For the 
purposes of this Note, the author uses the terminology “sufficiently similar.” 
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Without the adoption of this rule, inconsistent application of 
modern standing doctrine to consumer protection class actions 
will continue.  Accordingly, a steadfast application of the rule in 
consumer protection class actions is necessary to preserve the 
original policy underlying consumer protection statutes, which 
sought to enable the individual consumer, wronged by unfair and 
deceitful marketing tactics, to bring an action directly against 
the offending business. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. The History and Purpose of Consumer Protection Statutes in 
the United States 
Consumer rights were not a major concern within the United 
States until the latter part of the twentieth century.  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) was created in 1914 and was tasked 
with regulating “[u]nfair methods of competition” among 
businesses.41  However, the FTC’s mission was limited to 
protecting against “unfair methods” that were injurious to the 
“business of a competitor.”42  The FTC, therefore, was largely 
limited in its ability to protect the general public, and instead 
was focused primarily on inter-business regulation.43 
It was not until 1938 that Congress expanded the scope of 
the FTC’s authority to protect consumers from “unfair or 
deceptive” trade practices under the FTC Act.44  Congress’s intent 
was for the FTC Act to protect against both “inadvertent or 
uniformed advertising” and “vicious” advertising.45  Although 
Congress succeeded in expanding the scope of the FTC’s 
authority, the FTC failed to adequately exercise its enforcement 
powers to protect consumers.46  This changed in the 1960s when 
the American consumer protection movement finally gained 
momentum.47 
 
41 15  U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
42 Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 11. 
43 Id. 
44 15 U.S.C. § 45 ; see also Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 12 n.68 (discussing the 
Wheeler-Lea Amendment). 
45 H.R. Rep. No. 75-1613, at 5 (1937). 
46 Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 12. 
47 Id. at 10–11. The FTC’s ineffectiveness inspired a strong movement within 
state legislatures to enact consumer protection legislation, whereby, beginning in 
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By the 1970s—due in large part to the FTC’s inability to 
protect consumers and the passage of model statutes—almost 
every state had enacted consumer protection legislation.48  The 
state legislation was designed to better the public enforcement of 
consumer protection by employing state attorney generals to 
handle what was originally the FTC’s responsibility.49  The final 
hurdle in establishing consumer rights was adopting private 
causes of action for damages, which, by 1973, the majority of the 
states had done.50 
Today, every state has some form of consumer protection 
legislation.51  While the FTC Act prohibits unfair business 
practices, it only permits the FTC to bring suit.52  Accordingly, 
consumers must rely on state consumer protection statutes and 
other federal consumer protection statutes for any private causes 
of action.53  These statutes generally (i) enable private citizens to 
sue defendants who allegedly engage in unfair practices; 
(ii) permit plaintiffs to request the injunction of defendants’ 
harmful practices; (iii) provide plaintiffs with a low bar for 
causation; and (iv) contain provisions to punish the defendants.54 
The overall purpose of consumer protection statutes is the 
regulation of business practices to ensure the proper disclosure of 
information and enable a more equitably balanced relationship 
between consumers and businesses.55  Sometimes referred to as 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes, they 
are the main lines of defense protecting consumers from 
predatory, deceptive, and unscrupulous business practices,56 and 
 
the 1960s, three separate model statutes emerged. Id. at 14; see id. at 18 (analyzing 
the model statutes). 
48 Id. at 18. 
49 Id. at 18–19. 
50 Id. at 20 n.138. 
51 Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection 
Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010); Carter, 
supra note 13, at 5. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
53 Examples of federal consumer protection statutes include the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Truth in Lending 
Act. Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION, (last visited June 30, 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes. 
54 Meaghan Millan, Note, The Justiciability of State Consumer Protection 
Claims in Federal Courts: A Study of Named Plaintiffs Who Cease Using the 
Disputed Product yet Seek Injunctive Relief, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3565, 3569 (2013). 
55 21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 34 (2015). 
56 Carter, supra note 13, at 5. 
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“faulty and dangerous goods.”57  By enacting these statutes, state 
legislatures sought to remedy any injuries a private citizen 
suffered because of deceptive marketing.58 
These statutes provide consumers with a remedy for 
deceptive trade practices, without the onus of the burden of proof 
or the numerous defenses that are typically encountered in 
common law fraud or breach of warranty actions.59  Specifically, 
these statutes facilitate a plaintiff’s ability to bring suit by 
providing the plaintiff with a more lenient standard for proving 
causation.60 
The statutes are also designed to encourage private 
enforcement of their provisions.  Consumer protection statutes 
generally seek to eliminate deceptive business practices by 
(i) compensating the victim for his or her actual loss; 
(ii) punishing the wrongdoer with awards of treble damages; and 
(iii) incentivizing attorneys, by means of counsel fee provisions, 
to take cases involving minor loss to an individual.61  The most 
notable feature is the consumer’s ability to bring suit directly 
against a company that is allegedly using deceptive business 
practices.62  Additionally, the consumer may also request that the 
court enjoin the company from further engaging in such 
deceptive practices.63  This remedy demonstrates how the statute 
is designed to affect the wider group of consumers, other than the 
individual consumer, that purchases or may purchase the 
product after viewing the deceptive advertisement.64  
Finally, while the statutes provide for compensatory relief, 
the injuries caused by the deceptive behavior these statutes seek 
to prohibit are generally miniscule.65  However, in addition to 
being compensatory, consumer protection statutes are generally 
punitive in nature.  Accordingly, consumers will often recover 
punitive and treble damages should they prevail in their suits.66 
 
57 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 383 (10th ed. 2014). 
58 Millan, supra note 54, at 3569. 
59 Id. at 3570. 
60 See id. (noting that some state statutes do not require plaintiffs to prove 
reliance on the deceptive business practice and some states do not require that 
consumers be misled). 
61 21 C.J.S. Credit Reporting Agencies § 34 n.6 (2015). 
62 Millan, supra note 54, at 3570. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Carter, supra note 13, at 20. 
66 Id. at 20–21. 
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B. Class Actions and Consumer Protection Statutes 
Class actions have become a popular means of litigating 
consumer protection claims.67  The prevailing plaintiffs in 
consumer fraud class actions are entitled to recover their costs 
and reasonable attorneys’ fees.68  Class actions are frequently 
used to bring both federal and state claims against businesses for 
alleged unfair practices.69  Several federal consumer protection 
statutes specifically provide for class actions;70 class actions may 
also be brought under federal statutes that simply address 
consumer protection.71  Class actions may also be brought for 
violations of state consumer protection acts and unfair or 
deceptive business practice legislation.72 
Class actions are particularly efficient in the consumer 
protection context because the unfair and deceptive practices at 
issue are generally perpetrated against a large number of 
consumers.73  Additionally, because the injuries suffered by 
consumers who seek to invoke the protections of consumer 
protection statutes are generally small, class actions allow “the 
claims to be aggregated into a single action against a defendant 
that has allegedly caused harm.”74  By aggregating small 
damages, the class action mechanism allows consumers to deal 
with the economic reality that “each individual loss is likely to be 
too small to merit the cost of pursuing it” individually.75  The 
class action is, therefore, an effective means of remedying  
small-scale fraud affecting a wide number of people. 
 
67 Chris Cole, The Case of the Rise in Consumer Class-Action Suits, and What It 
Means, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 23, 2012), http://adage.com/article/guest-
columnists/case-rise-consumer-class-action-suits-means/234232/. 
68 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 19:107 (3d ed. 
2014). 
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., Truth in Lending-Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (allowing 
class actions for civil liability). 
71 See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2012) (regulating warranties on consumer products). 
72 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68. 
73 Carter, supra note 13, at 19. 
74 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
75 Id. 
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In 2005, in an attempt to remedy some of the abuses of class 
action litigation,76 Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act 
(“CAFA”).77  CAFA altered class action practice in the state and 
federal courts by changing the rules for federal diversity 
jurisdiction and removal, restricting the practice of coupon 
settlements, and changing the procedures for settling class 
actions in federal courts.78  Congress reasoned that by expanding 
federal diversity jurisdiction to encompass interstate class 
actions, more class actions would be funneled into federal court, 
where any abuse would be diminished.79  Congress’s main goal 
was to reduce forum shopping by plaintiffs in state courts with 
reputations for hostility to business defendants or reputations for 
“rubber-stamping coupon settlements under which the class 
counsel—not the class members—received the lion’s share of the 
benefit.”80  Since CAFA’s enactment, class actions have 
increasingly proceeded in federal court.81  Therefore, consistent 
with congressional intent, CAFA has proven to be an invaluable 
tool, permitting consumers to file class actions in federal court. 
1. Typical Consumer Protection Class Actions in Federal Court 
A typical consumer fraud class action is brought in federal 
court pursuant to either a federal consumer protection statute 
that provides for a class action,82 or a state consumer protection 
statute where there is minimal diversity among the parties and 
 
76 See generally Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use 
and Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 
999 (2002) (discussing the abuses of class action litigation). 
77 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. 
78 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:13 (5th ed. 2015). 
CAFA expanded jurisdiction for diversity class actions by creating jurisdiction for 
classes with more than 100 class members if (i) at least one class member is diverse 
from at least one defendant and (ii) more than five million dollars in total is in 
controversy, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
79 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 6:14. 
80 The Class Action Fairness Act, Five Years Later, MAYER BROWN (Apr. 12, 
2010) http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/The-Class-Action-Fairness-Act-five-years-
later-04-12-2010/. 
81 Id. Class actions that are originally filed in federal courts have nearly tripled; 
diversity removals from state courts have also increased. Id.; see also Emery G. Lee 
III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 
1723 (2008) (noting the increase was due primarily to increases in consumer class 
actions filed in, or removed to, federal court). 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 70–72. 
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all of CAFA’s preconditions are satisfied.83  Such class actions 
typically involve a large number of claimants who allege that 
certain widespread business or financial practices violate their 
rights as consumers.84  The amount of damages that each class 
member seeks is generally small, usually because (i) consumer 
fraud statutes that contain aggregate damages limitations limit 
the amount each individual class plaintiff can recover and 
(ii) plaintiffs often bring consumer fraud actions to stop 
defendant’s violative conduct, in which case, the recovery of 
damages is not the primary objective of the suit.85  Because 
unfair or deceptive practices generally do not substantially injure 
individual consumers, given that the injury is usually the 
purchase price of the product, consumer protection statutes allow 
claimants to unite in class actions.  The effect is that such 
miniscule individual injury, when multiplied by the thousands of 
affected consumers, will equate to substantial monetary value 
and will thereby allow the individual consumer to stymie the 
practice of the major corporation.86 
While consumer protection class actions are increasingly 
more prevalent in federal courts, class action plaintiffs continue 
to face obstacles in successfully adjudicating these actions.  For 
class actions generally, proper definition of the class is very 
important.  This means that courts will reject overly broad 
pleadings, requiring that the class be defined specifically.87  
Additionally, a class action must satisfy the prerequisites 
established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): 
numerosity,88 commonality,89 typicality,90 and adequacy of 
 
83 See supra note 78 (discussing CAFA’s preconditions). 
84 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68. 
85 Id. 
86 See generally id. 
87 Id. Courts have rejected overly broad definitions of the class, such as “every 
consumer injured by defendant’s unfair business practices.” Id.; see Forman v. Data 
Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (rejecting as overly broad the 
definition of a class that would include “all residents and businesses who have 
received unsolicited facsimile advertisements”) (emphasis omitted). 
88 The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members individually would 
be “impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
89 There must be questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(a)(2). 
90 The claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
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representation.91  The intrinsic nature of the consumer fraud 
class action ensures that numerosity is not generally an issue for 
a plaintiff seeking certification of a class.92  The requirements of 
commonality and typicality are also not problematic, because in 
the consumer protection context the defendant’s standardized 
conduct is the basis of the claim.93  Accordingly, the claims of the 
class members do not necessarily have to be identical, as long as 
they were injured by the same conduct of the defendant.  Finally, 
to satisfy adequacy of representation, the claims of the class 
representative must not conflict with those of the other class 
members.94  If these four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, 
then most consumer fraud plaintiffs will seek class certification 
under Rule 23(b)(3).95  For a Rule 23(b)(3) class action to be 
certified, the named plaintiffs must show that the common issues 
predominate the individual issues and that the class action 
mechanism is the superior means of resolving the claims.96 
For the purposes of this Note, the cases discussed will be 
decisions addressing a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  In these 
cases, named plaintiffs seek to assert consumer protection claims 
against products that the named plaintiffs did not themselves 
purchase, but which were purchased by members of the putative 
class.  Accordingly, these cases deal with plaintiffs who bring 
claims against a defendant alleging violations of consumer 
protection statutes, with the intent of certifying a class.  The 
defendant’s motion to dismiss occurs early in the litigation, 
before the named plaintiff has an opportunity to move for Rule 23 
class certification.  Therefore, in the cases that are addressed, the 
 
91 The person representing the class must be able to fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of all members of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
92 In consumer protection class actions, the alleged injury generally relates to 
products that have been purchased by large numbers of individuals. 
93 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68. 
94 Id. 
95 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings 
include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution 
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 
and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”) 
96 2 JOHN F.X. PELOSO ET AL., supra note 68. 
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main obstacle facing the named plaintiffs seeking to establish a 
class is a Rule 12(b)(1)97 motion to dismiss for lack of  
subject-matter jurisdiction.  Such a motion asks the court to 
dismiss the complaint, with the defendant typically arguing that 
the plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims relating to products 
or services that he or she did not purchase or use.  To understand 
this argument, it is important to analyze modern standing 
doctrine and its relation to class actions generally and consumer 
protection actions in particular. 
C. Modern Standing Doctrine in the Class Action Context 
In determining whether named plaintiffs have standing to 
pursue claims arising from putative class members’ purchases of 
products that the named plaintiffs themselves did not purchase, 
it is necessary to dissect contemporary standing doctrine into 
several parts.  Namely, this Note addresses (i) Article III 
standing, (ii) statutory standing, and (iii) class standing. 
Article III standing is derived from the pages of the United 
States Constitution.  It “identif[ies] those disputes which are 
appropriately resolved through the judicial process.”98  To 
establish Article III standing, the Supreme Court has delineated:  
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) “actual or imminent,” not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical.”  Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.”  Third, it must be 
“likely,” as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will 
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”99 
The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish such 
elements and because the elements are “an indispensable part of 
the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported . . . with the 
manner and degree of evidence required at successive stages of 
the litigation.”100 
 
97 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
98 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
99 Id. at 560–61 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 561. 
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Article III standing can be satisfied relatively easily in 
consumer protection class actions because economic injury is 
generally sufficient as a form of injury-in-fact to satisfy the first 
element of standing.101  Take, for example, a consumer who 
purchases a product based on a corporation’s deceptive 
marketing of that product.  If the consumer relies upon some 
representation made on the product’s label, and alleges that the 
representation turned out to be deceptive, thereby causing the 
consumer injury, the consumer has established a sufficient 
economic injury for the purposes of clearing Article III standing’s 
injury bar. 
The concept of statutory standing applies to legislatively 
created causes of action and “it asks whether a statute creating a 
private right of action authorizes a particular plaintiff to avail 
herself of that right of action.”102  Essentially, with statutory 
standing, the question is whether the plaintiff in a particular 
lawsuit is the person that Congress intended would recover 
through the creation of the statutory cause of action.  Statutory 
standing is satisfied if the consumer purchased the product that 
has given rise to the litigation and was injured monetarily as a 
result.103 
Class standing is a more elusive concept.104  This subset of 
contemporary standing doctrine applies exclusively to the class 
action mechanism.  Accordingly, where Article III and statutory 
standing are addressed at the motion to dismiss stage of the 
litigation, class standing is addressed at the Rule 23 class 
certification stage.  The inherent nature of a class action suit, 
with a plaintiff as a representative of a class, creates standing 
issues.  These issues occur primarily because “[i]n a properly 
certified class action, the named plaintiffs regularly litigate not 
only their own claims, but also claims of other class members 
based on transactions in which the named plaintiffs played no 
 
101 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1998) (noting that 
economic injury is sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirement of  
injury-in-fact). 
102 Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. 
REV. 89, 91 (2009). 
103 See id. at 94–95 (discussing what a plaintiff asserting statutory standing 
must establish with regard to his or her claim). 
104 See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance 
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 768 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The issue looks straightforward and one 
would expect it to be well settled; neither assumption is entirely true.”). 
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part.”105  Accordingly, class standing refers to the named 
plaintiff’s ability to serve as the representative of the members of 
the putative class.  This analysis is wholly independent from the 
inquiry into the named plaintiff’s standing to bring his individual 
claims.106  Because both standing and Rule 23(a) aim to 
determine whether the proper party is before the court, they 
appear to be related, but they are very different concepts.107  
When a named plaintiff lacks individual standing, the court must 
dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Article III standing.  
However, when a named plaintiff has individual standing, the 
court should proceed to the Rule 23 criteria to determine if the 
plaintiff may represent the class.108 
When a named plaintiff seeks to litigate harms that are not 
identical to the ones he or she suffered, but which other class 
members suffered, the situation generates confusion.109  In 
addressing such a situation, some courts simply find that the 
class representative cannot pursue the class members’ claims 
because he or she did not personally suffer the class members’ 
injuries, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has satisfied 
the individual standing requirement.110  Such courts effectively 
confuse Article III and class standing by addressing class 
standing prematurely, before class certification.  Other courts 
have found that the class representative has standing to pursue 
his or her own claims, and that any other claims should be 
analyzed according to class certification, not standing.111  Such an 
 
105 Id. at 769. 
106 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 408 n.4 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If 
named class plaintiffs have standing, the standing of the class members is satisfied 
by the requirements for class certification.” (citing 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.01, p. 2–3 (3d ed. 1992))). One court has recently 
defined class standing, holding: 
[I]n a putative class action, a plaintiff has class standing if he plausibly 
alleges (1) that he “personally has suffered some actual . . . injury as a 
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” and (2) that such 
conduct implicates “the same set of concerns” as the conduct alleged to have 
caused injury to other members of the putative class by the same 
defendants. 
 NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 162 
(2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
107 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6, n.0.50. 
108 See id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
FINAL_LEWIS 10/7/2015 7:15 PM 
342 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:325   
approach allows courts to then analyze the class representative 
at the class certification stage and thereby determine whether 
the representative’s claims are sufficiently typical or 
representative of the class members’ claims.112 
The inconsistent approaches federal courts use when 
applying standing doctrine in the class action context has only 
been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s lack of direction.  The 
Court has held that a plaintiff does not have Article III standing 
unless there is a showing that “he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatened injury as a result of some putatively illegal 
conduct of the defendant . . . [i]t is not enough that the conduct of 
which the plaintiff complains will injure someone.”113  
Additionally, the Court has explicitly noted, “Nor does a plaintiff 
who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind possess by 
virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of 
another kind, although similar, to which he has not been 
subject.”114  The Court has acknowledged that there is “tension” 
in prior case law “as to whether ‘variation’ between (1) a named 
plaintiff’s claims and (2) the claims of putative class members ‘is 
a matter of Article III standing . . . or whether it goes to the 
propriety of class certification pursuant to” Rule 23.115  
Accordingly, the Court’s inability to address the issue of 
“standing versus adequacy” has resulted in inconsistent court 
decisions.116 
Several circuits have held that the class action mechanism 
should be liberally interpreted and administered.117  These courts 
have rejected the strict application of standing doctrine, which 
 
112 Id. 
113 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).  
114 Blum, 457 U.S. at 999. 
115 NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 
160 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
263 & n.15 (2003)). 
116 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 263. 
117 See, e.g., Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680–81 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(finding the named plaintiffs, who were only injured by two counties themselves, 
were entitled to maintain the class action claims against seventeen other counties 
that had implemented the same state statute in the same way); Fallick v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding the named 
plaintiff, who only participated in one ERISA plan, could represent a class against 
all of the defendant’s ERISA plans when the essence of the complaint was a practice 
present in all of the plans). 
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provides that “no defendant may be sued unless a named plaintiff 
has a . . . claim against that defendant.”118  Instead, these courts 
reason that even defendants against whom no named plaintiff 
has a claim should be included in a class action if the claims 
against them are “essentially of the same character as the claim 
against a properly named defendant.”119  Such courts believe this 
issue should be dealt with during the Rule 23 stage of the 
litigation.120 
Accordingly, when a named plaintiff brings a consumer 
protection claim intending to certify a class, at the motion to 
dismiss stage, all that matters is whether or not the plaintiff can 
satisfy Article III and statutory standing requirements.  This 
holds true because class standing is not implicated until the 
actual class certification stage of the litigation, which occurs 
later.  If the named plaintiff adequately alleges individualized 
injury, then any claims relating to products the plaintiff has not 
purchased should be analyzed under the Rule 23 class 
certification prerequisites.  Although the case law is far from 
clear, it is apparent that weighing the similarity of a named 
plaintiff’s claim with that of a class member is an action that 
invokes the same analysis required by Rule 23(a). 
II. THE CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Recently, district courts across the country have addressed 
the procedural issue of whether named plaintiffs in a putative 
consumer protection class action could survive a motion to 
dismiss.  These same courts also addressed whether such 
plaintiffs have standing to pursue claims arising from the 
putative class members’ purchases of products that the named 
plaintiffs had not purchased themselves.  This Part discusses the 
conflicting decisions of the courts.  In particular, district courts 
have formulated two different tests with contradictory answers to 
this question.  Under the first approach, the named plaintiff does 
not have standing, so any claims relating to the unpurchased 
products must be dismissed.121  Alternatively, courts adopting the 
 
118 Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance 
Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 770 (1st Cir. 2011). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 See, e.g., Padilla v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11 C 7686, 2013 WL 195769, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2013); Pearson v. Target Corp., No. 11 CV 7972, 2012 WL 
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second approach have denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss and 
held that whether or not a named plaintiff can assert claims 
related to unpurchased products is a question addressed at the 
Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation.  However, courts 
adopting this second approach have complicated the issue by 
adopting inconsistent tests within their opinions.  Some have 
held that the named plaintiff can have standing over the 
unnamed class members’ products only so long as the products 
and alleged misrepresentations are “substantially similar.”122  
Other courts have held that the question is one for a Rule 23 
class certification analysis but do not inquire as to whether the 
products or misrepresentations are “sufficiently similar.”123 
The effect of this disagreement among the districts is that in 
a putative class action, in certain instances, a plaintiff in one 
state will have standing over products he or she did not 
purchase, whereas the same plaintiff in a different state will not.  
Such inconsistencies in the federal courts are detrimental to 
consumers who look to the judicial system to remedy injuries 
they have suffered due to unfair business practices and are, 
thereby, at odds with the policies underlying consumer protection 
laws.  Additionally, such inconsistency was the problem that the 
Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) originally sought to 
remedy—forum shopping resulting from different jurisdictions 
having more favorable laws.124  Accordingly, a uniform approach 
must be implemented so that this inconsistency within the 
district courts is not exploited. 
 
 
 
7761986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012); Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11–05403 
JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012); Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co., 
No. C 11–05188 SI, 2012 WL 5458396, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); Carrea v. 
Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C 10–01044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012). 
122 See generally Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 921–22 (N.D. Cal 
2012) (collecting cases); Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 
889–91 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same). 
123 See generally In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litigation, No. 12-MD-
2413 (RRM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013). 
124 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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A. A Named Plaintiff Does Not Have Standing 
In addressing this issue, the Northern District of Illinois has 
emphatically announced that a plaintiff does not have standing 
to assert claims relating to products purchased by unnamed 
putative class members and, accordingly, a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss must be granted. 
In Padilla v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,125 plaintiff Ray Padilla 
brought suit alleging violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud 
Act (“ICFA”).126  Padilla alleged that Costco Wholesale, Inc. 
(“Costco”) marketed and sold the Kirkland Signature Extra 
Strength Glucosamine HCL line of joint-health dietary 
supplements (“Kirkland Products”) in stores and online.127  The 
Kirkland Products named in Padilla’s complaint included two 
products with differing ingredients.128  Both products represented 
that if consumers took the supplements, they would experience 
optimum mobility while, at the same time, building cartilage and 
protecting their joints.129  Padilla alleged that in March 2011, he 
purchased one of the Kirkland Products from Costco, relying on 
the advertisement from the product’s label, and that his joint 
health was not improved as a result.130 
The court held Padilla failed to state an ICFA claim as to the 
other Kirkland Product because he had not purchased it and, 
accordingly, did not have standing.131  The court looked to the 
ICFA’s definition of “consumer,”132 and found that because 
Padilla had not purchased the product, he “ha[d] not sustained 
any actual damage”133 and did not fit within the definition.134  
The court rejected Padilla’s argument that “whether he is 
‘entitled to represent purchasers of Glucosamine Chondroitin 
does not turn on [his] standing to sue . . . but rather, on whether, 
 
125 2012 WL 2397012. 
126 Id. at *1. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *3. 
129 Id. at *1. 
130 Id. at *1–2. 
131 Id. at *2–3. 
132 See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1(e) (2007) (“[A]ny person who purchases or 
contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his 
trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.”) (emphasis 
added). 
133 Padilla, 2012 WL 2397012, at *2. 
134 Id. at *3. 
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under Rule 23(a), his claims are common and typical of 
purchasers of all of Costco’s Products.’ ”135  In determining 
whether Padilla could assert claims against the products he did 
not purchase, the court relied upon the fact that the two products 
at issue had different product formulations and different 
labels.136  The court noted Padilla could not use “the class-action 
device to ‘predicate standing on injury which he does not share’ 
with respect to” the product not purchased.137  The court reasoned 
that a named plaintiff cannot “piggy-back on the injuries of the 
unnamed class members,” to acquire standing “through the back 
door of a class action.”138  Accordingly, the court granted 
defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the product Padilla did not 
purchase.139 
The Northern District of Illinois has adopted a strict 
interpretation of the standing doctrine and its relation to 
consumer protection class actions.140  The court’s refusal to allow 
the named plaintiff to assert claims against any product other 
than that which directly harmed the individual plaintiff 
demonstrates the court’s constrictive application of the standing 
doctrine.  The increase in consumer protection class action 
litigation in federal court has ensured that this issue is 
increasingly present; the Northern District of Illinois is already 
considering another case with identical facts.141 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. (quoting Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
139 Id. 
140 See Pearson v. Target Corp., 2012 WL 7761986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012) 
(finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert claims against products he did 
not purchase by holding that the plaintiff “[was] mixing up the concept [of] standing 
with Rule 23 class representation” and asking, “[H]ow could [the plaintiff] possibly 
have been injured by representations made on a product he did not buy?”). 
141 See Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Guilin v. Walgreens Co., No. 
11-CV-07763 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2012), 2012 WL 6045111. The standing issue has 
been briefed and the parties are waiting for the ruling of the court. Additionally, 
another district has agreed with the Northern District of Illinois, holding that a 
named plaintiff did not have standing to assert claims relating to products that were 
not purchased by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., No. C 11-05403 
JW, 2012 WL 2847575, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012) (“[W]hen a plaintiff asserts 
claims based both on products that she purchased and products that she did not 
purchase, claims relating to products not purchased must be dismissed for lack of 
standing.”). 
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B. The Question Is Better Suited for a Rule 23 Class 
Certification Analysis 
Whereas some district courts have held a plaintiff cannot 
have standing to assert claims relating to products that he or she 
did not purchase, other district courts have held that such a 
determination must be made at the Rule 23 class certification 
stage of the litigation.142  However, in adopting this approach to 
the procedural issue, district courts have not been uniform and 
the inconsistent decisions have created a confusing legal 
landscape.  Namely, there are two applications of the second 
approach.  The first application finds that the named plaintiff 
can have standing over the unnamed class members’ products 
and survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as the 
products and alleged misrepresentations are “sufficiently 
similar.”143  The second application of the second approach agrees 
that the question is one for a Rule 23 class certification analysis, 
but does not inquire as to whether the products or 
misrepresentations are “sufficiently similar.”144 
The vast “majority of the courts that have carefully analyzed 
th[is] question hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert 
claims for unnamed class members based on products he or she 
did not purchase so long as the products and alleged 
misrepresentations are substantially similar.”145  The district 
courts employing this test look at the products that the named 
plaintiff is seeking to assert claims against and the alleged 
misrepresentations they contain, and compare them to the 
product and misrepresentation that the named plaintiff actually 
purchased and relied upon.146 
 
142 Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
143 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
144 See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
145 Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890. 
146 See id. at 891–92 (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring claims 
against unpurchased products because, although the products within the brand were 
dissimilar, the alleged misrepresentations were uniform, and standing is determined 
by considering “whether there are substantial similarities in the accused products 
and whether there are similar misrepresentations across product lines such that 
Plaintiffs’ injury is sufficiently similar to that suffered by class members who 
purchased other accused products”); Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., Nos. 
C-11-2910 EMC, C-11 3164 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012) 
(holding “the critical inquiry seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity 
between the products purchased and not purchased,” and finding sufficient 
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In the courts’ comparison, “where product composition is less 
important, the cases turn on whether the alleged 
misrepresentations are sufficiently similar across product 
lines.”147  For example, in Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,148 the 
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.149  
There, plaintiff was allowed to assert claims relating to a label 
suggesting an unpurchased Shout brand stain remover was 
environmentally friendly.150  The court found that the purchased 
product, Windex brand glass cleaner, was produced by the same 
company and bore a label that was identical to the unpurchased 
product.151  The court noted that “there is no brightline rule that 
different product lines cannot be covered by a single class,” and 
highlighted that the plaintiff was allegedly directly injured by 
defendants.152  Therefore, the court allowed plaintiff’s claims and 
deferred ruling on the standing question until class 
certification.153 
Conversely, “[w]here the alleged misrepresentations or 
accused products are dissimilar, courts tend to dismiss claims to 
the extent they are based on products not purchased.”154  For 
example, in Larsen v. Trader Joe’s Co.,155 the court found that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing over the unpurchased products because 
they challenged a wide range of Trader Joe’s products, including 
cookies and ricotta cheese, which bore insufficient similarity.156 
Accordingly, the district courts adopting the first application 
of the second approach have allowed the named plaintiff to assert 
claims relating to unpurchased products where the products were 
“substantially similar” to those actually purchased by the named 
plaintiff.157  In doing so, although they failed to expressly note it, 
 
similarity where different ice creams used the same labels for all of the products and 
plaintiffs challenged this mislabeling practice across different product flavors). 
147 Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890. 
148 No. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). 
149 Id. 
150 Id at *3. 
151 Id. at *1, *3. 
152 Id. at *3. 
153 See id. (“[T]he court will defer ruling on the issue until the class certification 
stage and denies defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety.”). 
154 Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 881, 891 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
155 2012 WL 5458396 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012). 
156 Id. at *1, *4–5 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012); see also Stephensen v. Neutrogena, 
No. C 12-0426 PJH, 2012 WL 8527784, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2012). 
157 Brown, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 890. 
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these courts were conducting a Rule 23 analysis at the motion to 
dismiss stage.  The courts were addressing whether there was 
class standing by analyzing whether the named plaintiff’s claims 
were adequate, common, and typical of the claims of the putative 
class members.158  While these courts generally failed to classify 
the issue as one of class standing, which is properly determined 
at the Rule 23 stage, the use of the “sufficiently similar” language 
shows that the inquiry was one in the same. 
Alternatively, the courts that have adopted the second 
application of the second approach to this procedural issue have 
explicitly noted that the determination is one meant for the Rule 
23 class certification stage.  Rather than examining whether 
there are “sufficient[] similar[ities]” to survive a motion to 
dismiss, these courts hold that the motion to dismiss must be 
denied, because whether the named plaintiff can assert claims 
related to the product purchased by unnamed class members is 
always a question for a Rule 23 class certification analysis.159 
The Eastern District of New York adopted this approach in 
In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc. All Natural Litigation.160  
There, plaintiffs brought a putative class action grounded in 
various federal and state-law claims, alleging defendants Frito-
Lay North America, Inc., and PepsiCo, Inc., deceptively labeled 
their products.161  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged defendants 
marketed various products as “All Natural” when, in fact, the 
products contained unnatural, genetically-modified organisms.162  
Plaintiffs alleged they paid a premium price for the products as 
compared to similar products not bearing an “All Natural” 
label.163  Accordingly, plaintiffs asserted that they relied on the 
defendants’ misleading and deceptive misrepresentations as to 
the “All Natural” quality of their products and that they would 
not have bought the products absent such representations.164 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging 
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claims related to the “All 
Natural” labeling of eight products that none of the named 
 
158 See supra text accompanying notes 104–08. 
159 See, e.g., In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litigation, No. 12-MD-2413 
(RRM), 2013 WL 4647512, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at *1. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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plaintiffs had purchased.165  In response, the plaintiffs argued 
that the question was not one of Article III standing, but instead 
a question of “class standing,” and therefore should be considered 
on a motion for class certification pursuant to Rule 23 rather 
than on a motion to dismiss.166 
The Eastern District agreed, holding it was a question of 
class standing and should therefore be addressed at the class 
certification stage of the litigation.167  The court noted that 
because the plaintiffs did purchase certain products, and were 
directly injured accordingly, the plaintiffs clearly had alleged 
sufficient facts to show that, individually, they had Article III 
standing.168  The court reasoned the real question was “whether 
plaintiffs [could] represent putative class members who suffered 
a similar injury arising out of the class members’ purchases of 
products that the plaintiffs did not purchase.”169  The court found 
it “remains undisputed that plaintiffs lack Article III standing to 
assert claims arising out of products that they themselves did not 
purchase.”170  Therefore, the court noted that had plaintiffs not 
purchased a product and been injured, they would not have had 
Article III standing.171  However, the court found that “once there 
is at least one named plaintiff for every named defendant ‘who 
can assert a claim directly against that defendant, . . . [Article 
III] standing is satisfied and only then will the inquiry shift to a 
class action analysis.’ ”172  In this case, because there was only 
one defendant, and the named plaintiff could, himself, assert a  
 
 
 
 
165 Id. at *10. 
166 Id. at *10–11. 
167 Id. at *12–13. The court did, however, note that “[e]ven if the inquiry here is 
one of Article III standing, there are cases conferring Article III standing to pursue 
claims on behalf of purchasers of products the named plaintiffs did not purchase so 
long as the products are ‘sufficiently similar’ to those the plaintiffs did purchase.” Id. 
at *12. However, the court noted that even these cases seem to suggest the question 
is truly one of class standing. Id. 
168 Id. at *11. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & 
Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 
2007)). 
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claim against that defendant based on that plaintiff’s purchase, 
Article III standing was satisfied, and the inquiry became one of 
class standing.173 
Therefore, in In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc. All Natural 
Litigation,174 the Eastern District held that because the named 
plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing at the motion to dismiss 
stage, they could pursue claims on behalf of putative class 
members against products the named plaintiffs did not purchase.  
There, what was being questioned was whether the plaintiffs’ 
injuries were sufficiently similar to those of the class members; a 
question that really concerned the named plaintiffs’ ability to 
adequately represent the interests of the class.  Such an inquiry 
is the objective of a Rule 23 class certification motion.175 
Most recently, in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.,176 the Eastern 
District once again determined this issue is better addressed at 
the class certification stage of litigation.  There, however, the 
court seemed to combine the class standing classification of In re 
Frito Lay North America, Inc. All Natural Litigation and the 
“sufficiently similar” language of the previous district court 
decisions adopting the second approach.177  There, defendant  
i-Health manufactured, sold, and distributed BrainStrong 
 
173 Id. at *13. The court relied heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in NECA-
IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co. Id. at *10. In NECA-IBEW 
Health & Welfare Fund, the court reasoned that once the plaintiff had established 
Article III and statutory standing, the inquiry shifted “from the elements of 
justiciability to the ability of the named representative to ‘fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.’ ” 693 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975) and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4)). 
174 2013 WL 4647512. 
175 Outside of New York, several California district courts have likewise found 
that a plaintiff’s ability to assert claims relating to products that were not purchased 
by the plaintiff is a question better suited for class certification. See, e.g., Cardenas 
v. NBTY, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 984, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding “whether Plaintiff 
may be allowed to present claims on behalf of purchasers of the remaining” products 
was a decision which would be analyzed solely under Rule 23); Dorfman v. 
Nutramax Labs., Inc., No. 13cv0873 WQH (RBB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136949, at 
*22 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013) (holding that any differences in the product purchased 
by the plaintiff and those purchased by the putative class members is an issue “best 
addressed at the class certification stage rather than the motion to dismiss stage”); 
Bruno v. Quten Research Inst., LLC, 280 F.R.D. 524, 530 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[W]hether a class representative ‘may be allowed to present claims on behalf of 
others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on 
an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation.’ ”). 
176 12-CV-5614 (JG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013). 
177 Id. at *28–31. 
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products—a line of four dietary supplements—throughout the 
United States.178  The products were advertised to “support[] 
brain health and function in children and adults.”179  After 
purchasing one of the products and using it as advertised, 
plaintiff alleged that her child’s brain health was not supported 
as represented.180  Accordingly, because of i-Health’s deceptive 
representations, the plaintiff brought a putative class action 
alleging violations of state consumer protection laws, asserting 
claims against three of the four BrainStrong products.181   
i-Health moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that plaintiff 
did not have standing to bring claims relating to the two 
BrainStrong products that she did not purchase.182 
The court held that “there [we]re sufficient similarities 
among i-Health’s products that any concerns regarding the 
differences c[ould] be addressed at the class certification 
stage.”183  The court noted that the products had similarities in 
packaging and labeling, and that any differences in the 
advertisements were immaterial.184  The court also focused on the 
fact that all of the products had the same core active 
ingredient.185  In doing so, the court seemed to formulate a hybrid 
application of the class standing classification and the 
“sufficiently similar” language.  The court concluded that because 
the products were sufficiently similar, any differences between 
them should be sorted out at the class certification stage.186 
Accordingly, there is a disparity in how district courts have 
dealt with a named plaintiff seeking to assert claims relating to 
products purchased by putative class members.  The first, the 
minority approach, is to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss 
claims relating to unpurchased products.  The second, the 
majority approach, is to allow the claims to continue because 
such a determination is meant to be determined during the Rule 
23 class certification stage of litigation.  However, within the 
majority approach exist two different, confusing applications for 
 
178 Id. at *3. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at *1–2. 
182 Id. at *27. 
183 Id. at *30. 
184 Id.  
185 Id. at *31. 
186 Id. at *30. 
FINAL_LEWIS 10/7/2015 7:15 PM 
2015] PROTECTING THE CONSUMER 353 
determining when claims relating to unpurchased products will 
survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The first application 
allows the plaintiff’s claims to survive defendant’s motion to 
dismiss if the purchased products and unpurchased products and 
their accompanying misrepresentations are “sufficiently 
similar.”187  Whereas the second application provides that the 
claims must survive because the determination is always one of 
class standing, not suited for a motion to dismiss, but rather, a 
Rule 23 class certification analysis.  Finally, at least two courts 
have used what appears to be a mixture of the two applications, 
using both the class standing classification and the “sufficiently 
similar” language, and holding that where the products are 
sufficiently similar, the claims will survive the motion to dismiss 
stage and proceed to a Rule 23 class certification analysis.188 
III. FINDING A SOLUTION 
This Note proposes a test for determining when, in a 
putative consumer protection class action in federal court, a 
named plaintiff’s claims relating to products he did not himself 
purchase, but which were purchased by unnamed members of the 
putative class, will survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.  By 
analyzing the ways that district courts have addressed this 
procedural issue, this Note determines which solution best 
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, the rationale 
underlying consumer protection statutes, and public policy, 
generally. 
As federal courts continue to maintain different approaches, 
the split of authority among district courts is only widening.  
Because CAFA has enabled consumers to bring their putative 
class actions in the federal courts, this issue is presenting itself 
more frequently.  In fact, there are numerous cases awaiting 
decision right now that will address it.189  For these reasons, the 
 
187 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
188 See Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding 
that because “there are substantial similarities between all of defendants’ 
[products], and the alleged misrepresentations on the labels of the [products] are 
nearly identical . . . the appropriate time to consider whether plaintiffs can bring 
claims on behalf of purchasers of all of the various [products] is at the class 
certification stage, not on a motion to dismiss”). 
189 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dimuro v. 
Estee Lauder, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-01789 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 6633707; 
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, In Re 
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issue is ripe for review.  This Note proposes that, unquestionably, 
the second approach is the correct judicial response.  However, 
this Note submits that the more appropriate way to address the 
issue is to adopt a multi-faceted test, like that adopted by the 
Eastern District of New York in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.,190 rather 
than simply automatically deferring to the Rule 23 stage of 
litigation. 
Because of the inconsistent judgments, American consumers 
are at a severe disadvantage.  The same claims brought by 
identical plaintiffs are being adjudicated differently in courts 
across the country.  Worst of all, the inconsistent judgments are 
not based on differences inherent in those courts’ applications of 
certain states’ different substantive laws.  These inconsistent 
rulings are based on district courts’ interpretations of 
contemporary standing doctrine.  Accordingly, a change is 
necessary so that plaintiffs who bring identical claims will not be 
subjected to different outcomes simply because of the district in 
which they initiate their suit. 
In determining which solution to this procedural issue best 
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, the purpose of 
consumer protection statutes, and public policy, it is important to 
immediately note that the first approach—granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying the plaintiff’s claims 
relating to unpurchased products—is the least appropriate.  In a 
putative consumer class action, once the named plaintiff has 
plausibly alleged personal injury, thereby satisfying Article III 
and statutory standing, determining whether the named 
plaintiff’s claims are representative of the unnamed putative 
class members’ claims is a question of class standing.  
Accordingly, because class standing is an issue addressed in a 
Rule 23 class certification analysis, the plaintiff’s claims should 
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  However, because the 
second approach is mired with inconsistent and confusing district 
court decisions, it is necessary to employ a test for better 
determining when a named plaintiff’s claims relating to 
unpurchased products will survive a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss. 
 
L’Oreal Wrinkle Cream Marketing Practices Litigation, No. 2:12-CV-3571 (D.N.J. 
July 8, 2013), 2013 WL 3941892; Second Amended Class Action Complaint, Guilin v. 
Walgreens Co., No. 11-CV-07763 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2012), 2012 WL 6045111. 
190 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013). 
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This Note proposes such a test, which builds off the analysis 
in Jovel v. I-Health, Inc.191 to remedy the current inconsistencies 
in the second approach.  The proposed test, like Jovel, allows the 
putative consumer protection class action to survive a 
defendant’s motion to dismiss where the named plaintiff’s claims 
relating to products purchased by the putative class members but 
not purchased by the plaintiff himself are “sufficiently similar” to 
those products actually purchased by the named plaintiff.  
However, in addition to adopting this Jovel test, the proposed 
test adds another component.  To promote consistency and 
enhance knowledge of the law, the test identifies certain 
situations that have arisen frequently in the cases addressing 
this issue, and presumes the existence of sufficient similarity 
between the products in such situations. 
A. The First Approach Does Not Comport with Contemporary 
Standing Doctrine or the Policy Underlying Consumer 
Protection Statutes 
There are several reasons why the first approach—granting 
defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying plaintiff’s claims 
against unpurchased products—is the incorrect approach to this 
issue.  The primary reason is the underlying purpose of 
contemporary standing doctrine: ensuring that a real case or 
controversy exists.192  In these cases, a real case or controversy 
absolutely exists.  A plaintiff is seeking to certify a class, the 
members of which have all been harmed after purchasing 
products with misrepresentations.  The only issue here is that 
the named plaintiff does not technically have an identical claim 
as the other putative class members because the named plaintiff 
purchased an immaterially different product.  Even if the 
misrepresentations are identical and the products are similar, 
the issue arises only because the products are not the same.  
Accordingly, if there were a named plaintiff for each separate 
product, there would be no issue at all.  But, simply because one 
named plaintiff asserts claims related to products purchased by 
unnamed class members, district courts adopting this approach 
hold the claims related to unpurchased products must be 
dismissed.  By essentially preventing the action from proceeding 
 
191 Id. 
192 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6. 
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for no reason other than the name that appears on the complaint, 
these courts undermine the purpose of standing doctrine, which 
is to ensure that plaintiffs who have personally suffered injury 
are provided a mode of redress. 
This approach is also incorrect because it confuses Article III 
standing with class standing.  As previously discussed, once the 
named plaintiff has plausibly alleged personal injury, thereby 
satisfying Article III and statutory standing, determining 
whether the named plaintiff’s claims are representative of the 
unnamed putative class members’ claims is a question of class 
standing.  Rule 23 is specifically designed to address any 
concerns about the relationship between a class representative 
and members of the class.193  Therefore, if a plaintiff has satisfied 
her individual standing requirement so as to establish a real case 
or controversy, then Rule 23 will address any concerns that arise 
due to the nature of the class action mechanism.194 
Additionally, because standing decisions invoke 
constitutional concerns, courts addressing this issue should 
choose the less complex class certification analysis over that of 
contemporary standing doctrine.195  Class certification “focuses a 
court on pragmatic factors in a familiar and accessible manner” 
and allows the court to adjudicate the issue in a 
“nonconstitutional manner.”196  This will only simplify the 
proceedings by eliminating any unnecessary constitutional 
litigation. 
Aside from contemporary standing concerns, this first 
approach also does not comport with the rationale underlying 
consumer fraud statutes.  As previously discussed, the goal of 
consumer protection statutes is to better enable consumers to 
bring causes of action for alleged unfair practices.197  The statutes 
were designed to lessen the burden on the individual consumer 
and place the onus on the major corporation.  If the objective is  
 
 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See id. (noting standing decisions are “abstract and often politicized”); see 
also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where a case 
in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal 
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without 
important reasons.”). 
196 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 78, § 2:6. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
FINAL_LEWIS 10/7/2015 7:15 PM 
2015] PROTECTING THE CONSUMER 357 
for the consumer to have redress, making it difficult for a 
plaintiff to bring a class action defeats the purpose of these 
statutes. 
B. The District Courts’ Inconsistent and Confusing Applications 
of the Second Approach Must Be Reconciled 
The second approach complies with contemporary standing 
doctrine and the policy underlying consumer protection statutes; 
however, the inconsistent and confusing decisions of the district 
courts need to be consolidated for uniform application and 
consistent results. 
The first application of the second approach provides that 
where the named plaintiff’s claims relate to unpurchased 
products that are “sufficiently similar” or have 
misrepresentations that are “sufficiently similar” to the product 
that the plaintiff actually purchased, the plaintiff has standing, 
and such claims will survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.198  
While this approach correctly holds that the named plaintiff’s 
claims should proceed past the defendant’s motion to dismiss, it 
fails to conclude that such a standing determination is the 
purview of a Rule 23 class certification analysis.199  Instead, the 
court simply finds that where the products and 
misrepresentations are sufficiently similar the plaintiff has 
standing, and the claims may proceed to the next stage of the 
litigation.  In doing so, the court is addressing, at the motion to 
dismiss stage of the litigation, that which is supposed to be 
reserved for the Rule 23 class certification analysis: whether the 
named plaintiff has adequately established class standing. 
The second application of the second approach provides that, 
where a plaintiff plausibly alleges individual injury, any 
determination of whether his or her claims against the products 
of the putative class members will survive defendant’s motion to 
dismiss must be analyzed at the Rule 23 class certification stage 
of litigation.  This means that whether the two claims are similar 
enough would automatically be determined by the Rule 23 
analysis.  However, such a rule would consequently undermine 
the efficacy of defendant’s motion to dismiss.  All that a plaintiff 
would have to allege was an intention to certify a class, and the 
 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 145–53. 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 87–96. 
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complaint could proceed past the motion to dismiss stage of the 
litigation.  A plaintiff who adequately alleges individual standing 
should not go unchecked in what additional claims he or she can 
allege.200  This concern was recently remedied by the use of a 
mixed approach.201 
The district courts’ inconsistent and confusing applications of 
the second approach were simplified through the creation of a 
mixed approach.  In Jovel v I-Health, Inc.,202 the Eastern District 
found the plaintiff’s standing to assert claims against 
unpurchased products was a determination for a Rule 23 class 
certification analysis.203  However, the court also incorporated the 
“sufficiently similar” language into its analysis.204  In doing so, 
the court formulated a hybrid application of the inconsistent 
decisions of the second approach, and one, which this Note 
advocates, that is the most appropriate method for dealing with 
this issue.  Such a test declares that the standing inquiry is one 
better suited for the class certification analysis, while also 
ensuring a plaintiff may not assert claims against products that 
have nothing to do with his alleged injury. 
C. The Proposed Test Will Comport with Contemporary 
Standing Doctrine and Effectuate the Policy of Consumer 
Protection Statutes, While Also Protecting Against Overly 
Broad Suits 
This Note’s proposed hybrid approach will better achieve the 
objectives of contemporary standing and consumer protection 
doctrines, while also ensuring that overly broad claims will not 
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The proposed test 
adopts the rule set out in Jovel.  Accordingly, the test permits the 
named plaintiff’s claims relating to unpurchased products and 
 
200 For example, the plaintiff should not be able to assert a class member’s claim 
for misrepresentation in relation to cleaning products when he has only personally 
been injured by alleged misrepresentations on a dietary supplement. Although the 
plaintiff has personally suffered an injury, the injury cannot be said to be 
representative of the injury felt by the unnamed putative class member. If allowed, 
this would circumvent the efficacy of defendant’s motion to dismiss, allowing the 
plaintiff to serve as representative for claims that bear no relation to his or her own. 
201 See Jovel v. I-Health, Inc., 12-CV-5614 (JG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139661, 
at *30–31 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (demonstrating the mixed approach). 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at *30. 
204 Id. 
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allows the suit to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage of the 
litigation, but only where the unpurchased products are 
“sufficiently similar” to the products that the named plaintiff 
actually did purchase.  However, in addition to the Jovel rule, the 
test highlights three situations where the named plaintiff’s 
claims are presumed to be sufficiently similar to those of the 
unnamed members of the putative class, so that such claims will 
survive a defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The three situations 
are: (i) when the product over which standing is sought is of the 
same product line as that product which was actually purchased 
by the named plaintiff; (ii) when the products have common 
ingredients or components and such ingredients or components 
are the primary or material selling points of the products; and 
(iii) when the plaintiff does not allege injury based solely on the 
alleged misrepresentations but rather on the diminution in value 
resulting from the product defect that exists in all products, such 
that if certification is granted, the proposed class would include 
plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims. 
The test adopts the second approach’s determination that the 
standing of the named plaintiff to assert claims over products he 
or she did not purchase is a matter properly addressed at the 
Rule 23 class certification stage of the litigation.  This test also 
comports with contemporary standing doctrine, because the issue 
being decided is whether or not the named plaintiff has class 
standing as opposed to Article III standing, which is the purpose 
of a Rule 23 class certification analysis.205 
However, to protect defendants from frivolous or overly 
broad suits, the plaintiff’s claims will only survive defendant’s 
motion to dismiss in certain limited circumstances.  A named 
plaintiff’s claims against products he or she did not actually 
purchase will only survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
when the unpurchased products are “sufficiently similar” to the 
product actually purchased by the named plaintiff.  The rationale 
underlying this approach is that, although an analysis of the 
similarity of the claims is better suited for a Rule 23 class 
certification, a named plaintiff should not survive a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss when he or she asserts claims against 
unpurchased products that have no cognizable similarity or 
nexus with the product that injured the named plaintiff.  
 
205 See supra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
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Allowing this would cause undue hardship to defendants because 
a named plaintiff could assert claims against every product in the 
defendant’s inventory, and then survive the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss simply because, in a class action, the question is better 
dealt with at the Rule 23 stage.  To protect against such an 
occurrence, the proposed test identifies three situations that have 
arisen frequently in the cases addressing this issue, where courts 
have allowed the claims to survive defendants’ motions to 
dismiss.  The test presumes that in these specific enumerated 
situations the named plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently similar to 
those of the unnamed putative class members. 
The first situation is where the unpurchased product is of 
the same product line as the product that was actually purchased 
by the named plaintiff.  As an example, assume that a plaintiff 
was injured when he bought a dietary supplement, which 
advertised and represented its ability to improve eyesight.  If the 
plaintiff sues alleging that his sight was not improved, the 
plaintiff should be able to assert claims on behalf of the unnamed 
putative class members against a product in the same product 
line that he did not purchase, but which is sold by the same 
defendant and similarly advertised and represented to improve 
eyesight.  Here, the unpurchased product would simply be a 
dietary supplement with minor variations to the product that the 
named plaintiff actually purchased.  Because the injury will be 
identical regardless of which product was purchased, the named 
plaintiff’s claims should survive to the class certification stage of 
the litigation.  That said, the converse is also true; plaintiff 
should not be able to assert claims relating to defendant’s 
misrepresentations concerning a weight loss dietary supplement 
that he never purchased.  This is somewhat obvious, and ensures 
that only in cases where the products are actually similar, will 
the claims against unpurchased products survive defendant’s 
motion to dismiss and proceed to the Rule 23 analysis.  This 
scenario works to protect the defendant against overly broad 
suits, so the defendant will not be forced to incur litigation costs 
resulting from the suit automatically proceeding to the Rule 23 
analysis. 
The second part of the test further limits the circumstances 
where a named plaintiff would be able to assert claims related to 
unpurchased products.  The requirement that the products have 
components or ingredients that are common and are the selling 
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point of the product line bolsters the “sufficiently similar” 
requisite.  Returning to the hypothetical, assume that the dietary 
supplement, which was advertised for its ability to improve 
eyesight, had as its active ingredient beta-carotene.  Assume also 
that the plaintiff seeks to assert claims relating to another 
product which is part of a different product line than the product 
plaintiff purchased.  The product in the other product line is 
similarly advertised as improving eyesight, but it contains triple 
the amount of beta-carotene as the product that the plaintiff 
purchased.  It also has additional ingredients such as Vitamin C.  
Can the plaintiff assert claims against this product, which was 
purchased by unnamed members of the putative class? 
The second part of our test is designed to address situations 
where products are not part of the same product line,206 but are 
sold for the same underlying purpose and differ in nonmaterial or 
insubstantial ways.  Accordingly, in the hypothetical, the 
plaintiff should be able to assert claims against the second 
product because, although it is technically different than the 
product plaintiff actually purchased, it was purchased by the 
unnamed class members for the same reason: improving 
eyesight.  Additionally, both products’ active ingredient is beta-
carotene.  Whether the products are too different from each other 
for class action purposes, simply because of the added Vitamin C, 
is a determination that should be addressed at the Rule 23 class 
certification stage.  Even though the strengths of the products 
are different and the ingredients are not identical, the products 
were bought for the same purpose and advertised to do the same 
thing.  Therefore, such claims should survive defendants’ motions 
to dismiss.  This situation captures instances where the named 
plaintiff and the class members purchase different products but 
the differences relate to minor, incidental variations in the 
composition of the products.207 
 
 
206 See Product Line Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/product%20line (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (defining product 
line as “a group of closely related commodities made by the same process and for the 
same purpose and differing only in style, model, or size”). 
207 The proposed test uses the “ingredient or component” language to capture 
situations where the products are not dietary supplements or other things designed 
for human consumption, that is, the 3-D feature of a new Samsung 3-D television 
model. 
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The final instance where courts should presume products are 
“sufficiently similar” and allow claims to proceed to class 
certification is where the named plaintiff does not allege injury 
based solely on alleged misrepresentations, but rather, on the 
diminution in value resulting from the product defect that exists 
in all of the products.  This situation focuses on the actual injury 
incurred and, thereby, allows the plaintiff to assert claims 
against unpurchased products when his actual injury is the same 
as the injury that the unnamed class members will allege.  This 
ensures that if certification is granted, the proposed class will 
include plaintiffs with personal standing to raise the claims.208  
This component of the test derives from the analysis in Donohue 
v. Apple, Inc.209  There, a consumer brought a putative class 
action alleging that a defect in his iPhone’s signal meter violated 
state consumer protection laws.210  The plaintiff asserted claims 
against Apple, Inc. because of his iPhone, but also sought to 
assert claims on behalf of purchasers of other iPhone models.211  
The court found that the plaintiff had standing to assert such 
claims because the plaintiff did not allege injury based solely on 
Apple’s alleged misrepresentations, but on the diminution in 
value caused by the defect itself, which “Apple ha[d] already 
admitted existed in every iPhone model at issue in th[e] case.”212  
Accordingly, the court focused on the fact that the injury was 
identical across the different iPhone models and all the members 
of the class would allege the same injury. 
To understand this, let us again return to our hypothetical.  
Plaintiff’s injury is that he purchased the particular dietary 
supplement, which did not perform as promised.  However, 
looking at the injury in a broader scope, the injury is also that 
plaintiff bought a specific dietary product from defendant, which, 
because it did not perform as promised, is worthless.  The class 
members similarly suffered an injury when they purchased a 
different particular dietary product, which did not perform as 
promised.  Aside from the specific injury of purchasing the 
product, which failed to perform as advertised, the class 
members were likewise generally injured because the dietary 
 
208 See Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 913, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
209 Id. at 913. 
210 Id. at 916–18. 
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product that they purchased became worthless when it did not 
perform as promised.  Accordingly, because the diminution in 
value resulting from the product defect caused the same type of 
injury in relation to all plaintiffs, regardless of which product 
was purchased, the claims are sufficiently similar to survive the 
motion to dismiss.  This situation is designed to cover instances 
where, unlike the first and second situations, the products are 
not of the same product line and do not necessarily share 
common ingredients or components. 
This Note’s proposed test promotes the underlying rationale 
of consumer protection statutes by better enabling consumers to 
seek a remedy for their alleged injuries.213  Because consumer 
protection statutes are designed to place the burden on the 
corporation that allegedly utilizes unfair or deceptive practices, 
allowing the suit to proceed to the Rule 23 analysis is consistent 
with this approach.214  The rationale behind consumer protection 
statutes is to create a mode of redress for the individual 
consumer by allowing that individual to sue the corporation 
directly, rather than having to rely on a state or federal 
enforcement agency.215  The idea was that this would place 
consumers—average citizens engaging in business  
transactions—on the same playing field as massive corporations, 
where the consumer would no longer be inherently 
disadvantaged when bargaining with corporations or industries.  
Allowing the plaintiff to assert claims relating to unpurchased 
products enables the plaintiff to address more than one unfair or 
deceptive practice in the suit.  The corporation engaging in such 
practices is, therefore, more likely to be held accountable, and the 
individual will be better able to redress every alleged injury. 
D. The Proposed Test Advances Public Policy Objectives 
The proposed test has the added benefit of comporting with 
two public policy objectives.  Namely, the test will promote 
efficiency and uniformity within the federal court system. 
The proposed test promotes efficiency, one of the principal 
tenets of the federal system.  “A federal judicial system that is 
inefficient . . . endangers the basic principles of our national 
 
213 See supra Part I.A. 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 61–64. 
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justice resource: quality resolution of our country’s most 
fundamental, important, and complex legal concerns within the 
context of the well-balanced governmental fabric of 
federalism.”216  Because the alleged unfair or deceptive practices 
of corporations usually relate to a consumer’s purchase of a 
single product, the damages relating to that individual injury 
will not be great.  Accordingly, consumer protection class actions 
allow plaintiffs to accumulate their alleged injuries into a single 
action with the potential for sizeable damages.  It is in the best 
interest of the federal system to promote this type of action 
because the class action mechanism effectively consolidates 
individual actions.217  The alternative would be multiple suits 
alleging injury due to the exact same misrepresentation simply 
found on different products. 
The other, more significant, policy implication of the 
proposed test would be the promotion of uniformity within the 
federal courts.  The importance of uniformity is a fundamental 
principle enshrined in the Constitution itself218 and favored in 
the federal courts.219  A federal system demands both uniformity 
in the interpretation of the substantive law and uniformity in 
procedure.220  The principal argument for uniformity is that 
“citizens of different jurisdictions should not be subjected to 
different interpretations of the same law.”221  However, there are 
numerous other interests that are also served by uniformity.  
Uniformity ensures the predictability of the law, thereby 
enabling “a legal regime to achieve its instrumental purposes.”222  
Without the uniform application of the law, “it is impossible for 
law to influence primary behavior effectively when individuals 
are subjected to inconsistent and conflicting signals about the 
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law’s meaning.”223  However, most importantly, “[n]ational 
uniformity of federal law ensures that courts treat similarly 
situated litigants equally—a result often considered a hallmark 
of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.”224  Without 
such uniformity, a plaintiff may be able to bring suit in one state, 
but fail in another.  While there exist many other justifications 
for uniformity in the federal court system,225 this inconsistency 
serves as an “impetus to forum shop,”226 and is therefore strongly 
disfavored in our judicial system.227 
Currently, district courts across the country address this 
procedural issue differently.  If a suit is brought in Illinois, the 
named plaintiff will be deemed to have no standing to assert 
claims relating to unpurchased products.  Within California, how 
this issue will be adjudicated depends on where you file suit, as 
the state’s district courts are split on the issue.228  In New York, 
as long as a plaintiff establishes Article III standing, the class 
standing question is not decided at the motion to dismiss stage, 
as it is properly addressed at a later stage of the litigation.229  
However, district courts within New York apply different tests, 
with one court employing the “sufficiently similar” language.  
Accordingly, district courts across the country are anything but 
uniform.  The approach this Note proposes would promote a 
uniform response to these cases, and ensure that district courts 
will no longer differ.  Instead, in a putative consumer protection 
class action, the named plaintiff’s ability to assert claims relating 
to unpurchased products would be a question of class standing 
and, as long as the products are “sufficiently similar,” would be 
an issue meant to be resolved at the Rule 23 class certification 
stage of the litigation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Consumer class actions will only become increasingly more 
relevant in today’s society, as these actions are the most 
convenient and efficient sources of relief for individual consumers 
who are wronged by large corporations.  This Note concludes that 
a named consumer protection class action plaintiff’s claims 
relating to products purchased by unnamed members of the 
putative class should survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
when there is “sufficient similarity” between the unpurchased 
products and the product plaintiff actually purchased, because 
such a determination is better suited for the Rule 23 class 
certification stage of the litigation.  To promote consistency and 
enhance knowledge of the law, this Note’s proposed test identifies 
certain situations that have arisen frequently in the cases 
addressing this issue, and presumes there exists sufficient 
similarity between the products in such situations.  Adoption of 
the proposed test will better enable a uniform application of 
standing doctrine, help reconcile the inconsistent decisions of 
district courts across the country, and ensure that courts comport 
with contemporary standing doctrine, the rationale underlying 
consumer protection statutes, and public policy concerns. 
